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teaching:markets-and-economics [2019/02/18 13:19]
seanburns
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-<markdown> 
-# Market and Economics 
-**Date: Thu 03 Mar 2019** 
  
-## Copyright and Budgets 
- 
-This week we're reading a piece on the ebook market, by Joseph Sanchez 
-(2015), and one on the academic journal market, by Bosch, Albee, and 
-Henderson (2018), and how each impacts library budgets. 
- 
-In order to understand Sanchez's article, we need to address some copyright 
-topics, and so in the next part of this lecture, I'll talk about copyright and 
-the first sale doctrine and how digital works have disrupted some basic ways 
-that libraries function. The article by Bosch, Albee, and Henderson discusses 
-a similar case among academic libraries, but with academic or scholarly 
-journals as the focal point, and here I'll also address some of the citation 
-metrics they discuss. 
- 
-### Sanchez (2015) 
- 
-Copyright law grants a monopoly to the person or corporate owner of an 
-intellectual property. That is, the copyright owner has exclusive rights 
-over the material that they own, where *they* could be a person or an 
-organizational entity. Section 106 of the law grants copyright owners 
-the following rights: 
- 
-> (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
-> 
-> (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
-> 
-> (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
-> the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
-> lease, or lending; 
-> 
-> (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
-> works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
-> perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
-> 
-> (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
-> works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
-> including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
-> audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
-> 
-> (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
-> publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
- 
-Source: [https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#106][1] 
- 
-[1]: https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#106 
- 
-These exclusive rights are all encompassing, and intentionally designed 
-to allow copyright owners a monopoly of their property. In principle and 
-under some constraints, this is a good thing. However, there are some 
-implications that we should consider. 
- 
-In short, if those exclusive rights were followed without any limitations, then 
-it would mean that the exchange of money for a work between a copyright holder 
-and a buyer for a physical book, a physical DVD disk, etc. would not entail 
-a transfer of ownership of that physical copy; that is, it would not allow the 
-buyer of the physical item any distribution rights of the item once the first 
-exchange has been made. Under such a scenario, libraries would be able to buy 
-physical books but would not be able lend them. Sounds ludicrous? 
- 
-The [First Sale Doctrine][2] helps avoid the issue granted by the full blown 
-list of exclusive rights granted by copyright ownership. Because of the first 
-sale doctrine, made a precedent in the early 20th century and then [codified 
-into law in 1976][3], you, I, or a library may buy a physical copy of a work, 
-such as a book, a DVD, a painting, and literally own that specific copy. First 
-sale doctrine does not grant us reproduction rights, as they are listed in 
-Section 106 of the copyright law, but it does allow us to distribute the 
-singular, physical representation or embodiment of the work that we have 
-purchased. Thus, this first sale doctrine is why libraries were able to thrive 
-throughout the 20th century, lend material, and preserve it. More mundanely, 
-it's also why I can buy a book at a bookstore and later give it away or sell it 
-to someone after I've finished it, such as at a used bookstore. 
- 
-[2]:https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/ 
-[3]:http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#109 
- 
-The digital medium makes things messier, though. There are two big reasons for 
-this. One, digital works are not subject to the same distributions constraints 
-that physical works are subject to, and the first sale doctrine is all about 
-distribution rights, not reproduction rights. If I have a physical copy of some 
-book and give you my copy of that book, then I no longer have that copy. 
-However, if I have a copy of a digital file, then as we all know, it's 
-relatively trivial for me to share that file with you without losing access to 
-my own copy. Since digital works can be copied and distributed without anyone 
-losing access to their copies or even to the original, the First Sale Doctrine 
-does not apply. In the digital space, there are far fewer limitations on 
-supply, including on lending. 
- 
-Second, many digital works are like software, or at the very least, they are 
-fully intertwined with the software needed to display them. This is true for 
-all kinds of documents, such as HTML pages in the browser or audio files played 
-through a media player. But let's consider ebooks as an example. Ebooks come in 
-all shapes and sizes. Project Gutenberg distributes ebooks that are in the 
-public domain and in various file formats, such as plain text documents that 
-have no presentation markup like bold, italics, etc., HTML documents with 
-markup, XML documents like EPUB, and then also PDFs and others. Why so many 
-file formats? Text is text, right, and in the print space, a book is simply 
-printed on a page, even if it's sometimes printed on different size pages or 
-using different type settings. But these various markups exist because they 
-each offer technological or presentational advantages and are often tied to 
-specific pieces of software. 
- 
-This is especially true for proprietary file formats, like the ones that Amazon 
-created for use only on Kindles, or the popular MP3 file format for audio 
-recordings that only recently became patent free. While file formats like these 
-may not be necessarily counted as software, depending on how we define 
-software, but more like data structures, it is certainly true that file formats 
-and the specific software applications that display can be completely 
-intertwined. If you are old enough, you may remember the headaches caused with 
-files created as **.doc** in some early version of Microsoft Word that later 
-failed to display properly in a future Microsoft Word version or in some other 
-word document software. 
- 
-In short, these complexities introduce obstacles to the first sale doctrine and 
-raise other copyright issues because of the connection to software, which is 
-also often copyrighted. The result is that copyright holders and publishers 
-have little financial interest in selling actual digital copies of works, since 
-they cannot prevent future sales without impacting, i.e., limiting supply, and 
-instead are more motivated to license material and sometimes explicitly tie 
-that material to specific pieces of software and hardware, such as the Kindle, 
-which would have to be bought. 
- 
-What does this mean for libraries in the digital age? It means that libraries 
-buy less and rent or license more, and renting means that they continually pay 
-for something for as long as they want access to it. As Sanchez (2015) puts it, 
-"At its simplest, this takes the form of paying x dollars per year per title 
-during the length of the contract." When the total supply of works increases, 
-e.g., the total number of published books increases, as they do each year, then 
-it means renting more and more without ever completely acquiring. When budgets 
-are cut or are stagnant, this ultimately means a decline in the collection 
-a library has to offer, or if not a decline in the collection, then cuts in 
-some other areas of a library, such as the number of librarians or other staff. 
-This is the unique conundrum that Sanchez raises in his article. 
- 
-If that alone were the issue, maybe librarians could figure out other 
-sustainable ways to proceed, but Sanchez raises additional issues and 
-questions: what if publishers raise the prices for digital content at an annual 
-rate faster than what they already raise for print content (reasonable 
-assumption)? If so, does that mean that librarians will be able to afford fewer 
-titles, digital or print, unless they raise their budgets, and, as they weed, 
-how would that impact the physical space of the library? See figure 2.3, 
-specifically, from Sanchez's article. The plot shows just how much could be 
-lost and how little gained if the forecasts Sanchez discusses pan out. 
- 
-Keep all of this in mind as you process Sanchez's article. You can even connect 
-it to some discussions you've already had about accessing digital content. 
-Specifically, there are many ways to put constraints on the supply of an item 
-in the digital landscape, as opposed to limiting supply in the physical space, 
-which include fewer methods. That is, it's relatively easy for publishers and 
-others to restrict the supply of physical works. They simply have to limit how 
-many of those physical works are manufactured (e.g., the number of print runs). 
-But given the nature of digital content, restricting supply is driven by the 
-technologies available to do so, and since there are so many publishers and 
-distribution points, then each one of these points will often create their own 
-unique type of constraint on the supply. The result is that there will be 
-a number of confusing methods implemented to limit constraint, even if these 
-limitations are marketed as selling points. In practice, this may mean that 
-only a limited number of people may "check" out a work from a library at one 
-time, or access a database at one time, and so forth. Thus the budget issue has 
-an impact on access and usability. 
- 
-Read more about copyright: 
- 
-[https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html][4] 
- 
-[4]:https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html 
- 
-### Bosch, Albee, & Henderson (2018) 
- 
-Although ebooks likely represent the biggest impact on public library budgets, 
-academic libraries are largely concerned with scholarly journals. Like Sanchez 
-(2015), Bosch, Albee, & Henderson (2018) show that the major issue here is that 
-academic library budgets are declining or holding flat, even though prices 
-continue to increase for journal titles and though the number of published 
-articles increase. This raises an interesting phenomenon -- that although 
-researchers are among the most hurt by the lack of access to research, 
-researchers are also part of the cause of the increase simply because they 
-continue to publish more and more. Ironically, the result of that rate of 
-increase is less access for all or most.  
- 
-The authors also note that part of the drive to publish includes a drive to 
-publish in so-called *prestigious* journal titles, where *prestigious* is 
-determined by how well cited the title is. The authors refer to a few 
-citation-based metrics that the research community uses to determine prestige. 
-These include the long-established *Impact Factor*, which can be examined in 
-the *Journal Citation Reports* (JCR) provided by Clarivate Analytics, as well 
-as newer ones, such as the *Eigenfactor* and the *Article Influence Score*, 
-which can also be examined in JCR (the eigenfactor.org site is not well 
-updated, at the time of this writing). 
- 
-One motivation for using some sort of citation metric as the basis of 
-evaluating journal titles is because citation metrics indicate, at some level, 
-the use of the title. That is, a citation to an article in a journal title 
-means, ideally, that the authors citing that article have read the article. 
-Historically, when Eugene Garfield invented the *Impact Factor*, it was partly 
-so as a tool for librarians to use in collection management because he 
-recognized this use-based theory of citations. 
- 
-However, citation metrics should never be the sole or even primary tool for 
-such purposes, though. While they may provide good information, there are many 
-caveats. First, there are different fields of research, and some fields cite at 
-different rates and at different volumes than other fields, and also for 
-different reasons. This is why, in Table 5 of the Bosch, Albee, and Henderson 
-(2018) article, the cost per cite for journals in the Philosophy & Religion 
-category are so much higher that the cost per cite of titles in other 
-categories. Authors in P&R simply have different citation and publishing 
-behaviors than authors in other categories. Second, citations do not capture 
-all uses of a journal. For example, there are many journal titles that I might 
-use in my courses but may not use in my research, and this is true for many 
-other faculty, yet citation metrics won't reflect that kind of use. The authors 
-refer to *altmetrics*, which was invented to help capture additional non-citing 
-uses of scholarly products, but altmetrics is still in its infancy and is 
-largely dependent on data sources and scholarly behavior that are problematic 
-themselves. Third, there are various issues with the metrics themselves. The 
-*Impact Factor* is based on a calculation that is outdated and not a very 
-appropriate statistical measure. The other calculations were created to address 
-that but may have other problems. And four, the use of the metrics, regardless 
-of which one, tends to drive publishing behavior -- such that journal titles 
-with higher metrics tend to attract more submissions and more attention, thus 
-driving more citations to them. Thus, citation based metrics are comparable to 
-a kind of capitalist economic system where, as the sociologist of science 
-Robert Merton noted, the richer get richer and the poor get poorer. The issue 
-then is that prestige, defined in this way, does not necessarily indicate 
-quality -- just use. 
- 
-The authors also discuss some of the issues with *Gold Open Access* and the 
-idea that Gold OA may compound the cost problem. This is where authors pay 
-a publication fee, or an article processing charge (APC), once a manuscript has 
-been submitted and accepted by a journal (there are other types of Gold OA cost 
-models). We can do a quick off the cuff and rough calculation to see why this 
-might compound the problem. As an example, *PLOS ONE* is one of the largest 
-gold OA journals and charges an [APC of $1,595 USD][5]. In 2018, 32 papers were 
-published in PLOS ONE that included at least one author from the University of 
-Kentucky, totaling <span>$</span>51,040 in APCs for the 50 total institutions that were 
-associated with these papers. Thus, this amounts to about $1020 per 
-institution, payed for by the authors and not libraries. For UK authors, this 
-also amounts to over <span>$</span>32,640 spent on APCs (32 * <span>$</span>1020). This is about <span>$</span>27K 
-more than the average price of the most expensive category, Chemistry, as 
-reported in Table 1 of the reading. I'll leave it at that. 
- 
-In a follow up video, I'll demonstrate some of the tools used to look at the 
-discussed metrics. 
- 
-[5]:https://www.plos.org/publication-fees 
- 
-## References 
- 
-Bosch, S., Albee, B., & Henderson, K. (2018). Death by 1,000 Cuts. 
-Library Journal, 143(7), 28–33.  
- 
-Sanchez, J. (2015). Chapter 2. Forecasting Public Library E-content 
-Costs. Library Technology Reports, 51(8), 9–15. Retrieved from 
-https://journals.ala.org/index.php/ltr/article/view/5833 
-</markdown> 
teaching/markets-and-economics.1550513965.txt.gz · Last modified: 2019/02/18 13:19 by seanburns